

Western Investment LLC

DWS RREEF WORLD REAL ESTATE AND TACTICAL STRATEGIES FUND INC.

Annual Meeting of Stockholders

July 12, 2010

Western Investment LLC

Ethical Activism

- Western Investment is an investor specializing in investing in closed-end funds and has proven over many years to be ethical activist investors for all stockholders. We have taken a stance in connection with 32 issuers since 2004.
- All completed activism situations resulted in significant pro-stockholder action by the issuer. In every situation, the same result was available to all stockholders. We did not benefit in any way except as a stockholder, we have never accepted any fees nor did we accept “greenmail” or ever participate in any transaction not available to all other stockholders.
- We are proud of our public record, and proud of the role we have played in creating value for stockholders.

Western Investment LLC

Ethical Activism

- Western has large investments in numerous funds managed or controlled by Deutsche Investment Management Americas Inc. and its affiliates (“Deutsche”).
- We believe that Deutsche is taking advantage of stockholders in its closed end funds, and in this Fund in particular.
- Deutsche is maximizing its own benefits at stockholders’ expense.
- We are committed to doing something about it, and are fighting to end Deutsche’s management of closed-end funds.

Western Investment LLC

Hold Deutsche Accountable

- Western and its affiliates own approximately 12% of the outstanding shares of the Fund.
- We are the Fund's largest stockholder.
- We seek your support to elect our 4 highly qualified, independent, engaged and effective nominees to the Fund's board. If elected, our nominees would comprise a minority of the Board.
- We are also seeking support for our proposal that the Board take the necessary steps to declassify the Board so that all directors are elected on an annual basis.
- We believe Deutsche has clearly demonstrated that they should not be managing the Fund. Vote FOR our nominees and FOR our proposal to declassify the Board and hold directors accountable annually.

Our Objectives


- Put stockholder representation on the Board and replace the conflicted, compromised and ineffectual incumbents. Help stockholders achieve fair value through corporate democracy.
- Declassify the Board. Hold DRP's "stockholder-proof" directors accountable!
- Obtain better management to work for improved performance.

Dismal Stock Performance



- Stockholders paid (split-adjusted) \$40.00 per share in the Fund's public offering. It is trading today at about \$14.50.
- The Fund has had a negative -19.33% annualized return.
- Since inception, the Fund's total return has been a negative -46.97%.

Discount to NAV – Nobody's Accountable



DWS RREEF World Real Estate & Tactical Strategies Fund (DRP)

Impact of Additional Share BuyBack on NAV						
Percentage of volume purchased	Number of additional shares bought back	% of currently outstanding shares bought back	Weighted average buyback discount	% NAV accretion	NAV with buyback accretion	
0%	-	0.00%	-17.25%	0.00%	\$15.68	
5%	980,464	16.46%	-17.25%	3.40%	\$16.21	
10%	1,960,928	32.93%	-17.25%	8.47%	\$17.01	
15%	2,941,392	49.39%	-17.25%	16.84%	\$18.32	
25%	4,902,321	82.31%	-17.25%	80.29%	\$28.27	
30%	5,882,785	98.78%	-17.25%	1391.98%	\$233.94	

Impact of Additional Share BuyBack on Per-Share Return on Equity (ROE)						
Percentage of trading volume purchased	\$ NAV Accretion	Gross \$ earnings increase (\$ NAV Accretion x ROE)	Per-share expense increase	Net EPS increase after fees	EPS after buyback	
0%	-	-	-	\$0.000	\$1.254	
5%	\$0.53	\$0.043	\$0.018	\$0.024	\$1.279	
10%	\$1.33	\$0.106	\$0.046	\$0.060	\$1.315	
15%	\$2.64	\$0.211	\$0.092	\$0.120	\$1.374	
25%	\$12.59	\$1.007	\$0.437	\$0.571	\$1.825	
30%	\$218.26	\$17.461	\$7.567	\$9.894	\$11.148	

Basic assumptions	
DRP NAV (6/7/2010)	\$15.68
Expected portfolio ROE	8%
Base \$/share ROE = NAV x Expected ROE	\$1.254

This analysis assume the company buys back a fixed percentage (5%-30%) of the trading volume each week at the weekly discount when the weekly discount is 3% or greater. Buying back shares at a discount results in NAV accretion — increased NAV per share.

The ROE analysis assumes an 8.0% base ROE (other ROE's provide similar results). Given an increased NAV per share and a positive expected return on that NAV, the expected ROE per share increases as well (= % NAV increase * ROE). This is only partially offset by per-share expense increases due to allocation of fixed costs over a smaller number of shares.


The expense analysis and assumptions associated with share reductions are derived from the most recent publicly available financials and are listed on the next page.

Discount to NAV – A Workable Solution

- In certain instances, as highlighted in a press release issued by the Putnam Funds, fund returns were increased by as much as 24% through repurchases.

	Contribution of Share Repurchases to Total Returns at Net Asset Value (10/25/05-8/31/09)	Cumulative Total Returns (Including Share Repurchases) at Net Asset Value (10/25/05-8/31/09)
Putnam High Income Securities Fund (NYSE: PCF)	2.00%	12.51%
Putnam Managed Municipal Income Trust (NYSE: PMM)	0.89%	3.77%
Putnam Master Intermediate Income Trust (NYSE: PIM)	2.03%	9.62%
Putnam Municipal Opportunities Trust (NYSE: PMO)	1.27%	8.18%
Putnam Premier Income Trust (NYSE: PPT)	2.68%	11.11%

Discount to NAV – A Workable Solution



THE BOARD ADOPTS ENTRENCHING BYLAW AMENDMENT

- The incumbents enacted a by-law that requires the vote of an absolute majority of *outstanding* shares for election of a director. Stockholders never approved this by-law amendment.
- The absolute majority vote by-law is designed to make contested elections fail and have unelected incumbents remain in office without end.
- The by-law protects directors' relationship with Deutsche but does nothing to protect Fund stockholders. It simply serves to keep Deutsche and its derelict board on the gravy train.

THE BOARD CHANGES THE RULES

- In the Fund's offering prospectus, it states "The Fund's Charter provides that, except as otherwise provided in the By-Laws, directors shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of stock outstanding and entitled to vote thereon. **The Fund's By-Laws provide that a plurality of all the votes cast at a meeting of shareholders shall be sufficient to elected a director.**"
- The Fund disclosed on April 17, 2009 that on March 11, 2009 the Board had amended the By-laws to provide for the "election of directors of the Fund by an affirmative vote of a majority of the shares of stock outstanding and entitled to vote in the election of directors."
- This amendment did not have stockholder approval and serves to disenfranchise stockholders and entrench management.

Demand Accountability!

- The absolute majority vote required in the election of directors has drawn criticism from Andrew Donohue, the SEC's Director of the Division of Investment Management who, in a speech in November 2009, expressed his personal view that it "amounts to an anti-takeover device that keeps the existing board in place."
- A bill passed by the United States Senate and currently in committee would revise the SEC rules to require a plurality vote standard in contested elections or have the company face delisting. A significant majority of S&P 500 companies already comply.
- Incredibly, some of the Fund's sister funds in the Deutsche complex provide that if no one meets the absolute majority vote threshold, the incumbents up for election retain their seats for another full three year term. This was the case with DHG, where Western won the election but lost the war – our nominees received more votes than Deutsche's, but the Deutsche directors are set for another full term.

BOARD IGNORES SHAREHOLDER VOTES

The DRP Board members have again and again ignored shareholder votes, using legal technicalities to remain in office

	<u>For Western Investment Nominees</u>	<u>For Fund Nominees</u>	<u>Result</u>
GCS 2008 Annual Meeting	6.8mm votes	3.6mm votes	Five incumbent Deutsche Directors held over and still serve
GCS 2009 Annual Meeting	2009 Annual Meeting was not held by the Fund – 2010 Annual Meeting held only after a lawsuit filed by Western Investment		
DHG 2010 Annual Meeting	6.9mm votes	5.1mm votes	Four incumbent Deutsche Directors held over and still serve
DHG 2010 Annual Meeting	8.2mm votes for Western Investment's proposal to declassify the Board	3.9mm votes against the proposal	No action taken or announced

Deutsche Disrespects The Rules

- The current directors have continued to support retaining Deutsche as the Fund's advisor despite repeated censure from the SEC, run ins with other regulatory bodies and shareholder lawsuits.
- They have run afoul of the SEC and other regulatory bodies multiple times. Since 2003, Deutsche Asset Management has been the subject of no less than three SEC censures for serious violations:
 - Illegal mutual fund market timing practices.
 - Concealing trade steering and favorable commission arrangements with favored brokers.
 - Essentially trading its “proxy” votes for banking business.

Why Are They Still In Charge?

- Deutsche's self-interested actions have resulted in, among other things:
 - A \$250 million agreement with the NYS Attorney General to compensate those injured by its market-timing activities.
 - Numerous civil suits related to market-timing.
 - Suit re failure to disclose risks in liquidated funds (SRQ and SRO) which lost 88 and 95% of value and were likely facing a losing shareholder vote.
 - Suit and settlement with the SEC re auction rate securities.
 - West Virginia Securities Commission "cease and desist" order re auction rate securities.

DEMAND ACCOUNTABILITY!

Deutsche refuses to play by the rules, and loses your money anyway.

WHY ARE THEY STILL IN CHARGE?

- Checkered regulatory history.
- Instituted absolute majority vote at DRP and 5 other Deutsche closed end funds without a shareholder vote.
- Ignores stockholder votes.
- Disregards basic standards of corporate governance.
- Object of numerous shareholder lawsuits.
- Dismal operating performance.
- Ineffective and compromised board.
- **Help us dump them.**

**WE ARE WILLING TO STAND UP AND FIGHT
FOR STOCKHOLDERS.**

**VOTE THE GOLD CARD NOW
FOR TRUE REPRESENTATION ON THE DRP BOARD.**

OUR SLATE:

Highly Qualified

Professional

Accomplished

Experienced

Neil Chelo

Director of Research of Benchmark Plus Management, L.L.C. (“BPM”), the managing member of each of Benchmark Plus Partners, L.L.C. (“BPP”) and Benchmark Plus Institutional Partners, L.L.C. (“BPIP”). Prior to serving as Director of Research, Mr. Chelo served as a senior analyst at BPM. BPP and BPIP are each in the business of acquiring, holding and disposing of investments in various companies. Prior to joining BPM, Mr. Chelo served as a portfolio manager and trader at Rampart Investment Management Company, an asset manager specializing in derivative strategies. Mr. Chelo received his Bachelor of Science in Finance and his Master of Science in Finance from Bentley College. Additionally, Mr. Chelo has been awarded the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA) and Financial Risk Manager (FRM) designations. Mr. Chelo’s extensive experience in the investment industry gives him a strong understanding and insight into the challenges and issues facing the Fund.

Robert H. Daniels

Emeritus Professor of Accounting at San Francisco State University, where he has taught Tax and Business Law courses since 1983 and has served as acting Department Chair, Director of the Graduate Tax Program and member of the University Budget Committee. Mr. Daniels' research interests include the problem of tax complexity and the prospects for simplification. Mr. Daniels also currently manages his own private tax consulting practice and has been a practicing California attorney since 1973. Mr. Daniels received his B.A. from Harvard College, with honors, a J.D. from Harvard Law School and his LLM in Taxation from Golden Gate University. Mr. Daniels' extensive accounting and tax knowledge and research and academic experience will provide valuable insight to the Board. Mr. Daniels has thirty years of experience as an investor in closed-end funds.

Gregory R. Dube

Founder of Roseheart Associates (“Roseheart”), a private company that invests in securities and real estate, and has served as managing member and Chairman since its inception in 1997. From 1998 to 2002, Mr. Dube was at Alliance Capital, where he served as the head of the Global High Yield Group from 1999 to 2002. Before joining Alliance Capital, Mr. Dube was a partner at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, responsible for the Tax-Exempt Capital Markets Division. Mr. Dube has an extensive background in the credit securities markets, including experience with trading and selling credit instruments, including corporate, high-yield, private placement, mortgage, Euro and distressed debt and derivatives. Mr. Dube currently serves on the Advisory Committee of New England Realty Associates Limited Partnership (AMEX:NEN), a partnership engaged in the business of acquiring, developing, holding for investment, operating and selling real estate, and as a member of the executive committee of Navigare Partners, LLC. Mr. Dube received his A.B. from Harvard College and was a Rhodes Scholar Nominee. Mr. Dube’s extensive investment experience, background in the credit securities markets and public board experience provides unique insight to the challenges and issues facing the Fund.

Arthur D. Lipson

Has successfully managed private investment partnerships since 1995. Principal of Western Investment, he has been the sole managing member or investment manager, specializing in undervalued stocks since 1997. Mr. Lipson first started working on Wall Street at Goldman Sachs in 1968 as a quantitative analyst, and also worked at Lehman Brothers and Paine Webber where he was responsible for all fixed income research at both firms. He is a known leader in the industry, and created, among other things, the Lehman Brothers Bond Indices. Mr. Lipson received a Masters of Science from Columbia University and a Bachelor of Science from the California Institute of Technology.

VOTE THE **GOLD** PROXY

VOTE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY!

**VOTE FOR THE SLATE THAT IS COMMITTED TO THE
REALIZATION OF FAIR VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE
DEMOCRACY.**

**VOTE FOR THE SLATE THAT WILL REPRESENT YOU AND
ADVOCATE FOR CHANGE.**